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THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED, THE EVOLUTION
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. By Stephen P. Halbrook.1 Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico
Press. 1984. Pp. xii, 274. $19.95.
F. Smith Fussner2
This book informs, challenges, and should change people's understanding of the second amendment and of past and present policy debates. The title is from Patrick Henry; the subtitle describes
the book's contents. Halbrook summarizes his purpose in the introduction: "After investigating the philosophical, common law, and
historical backgrounds of the right to keep and bear arms, this work
analyzes the state and federal court opinions on this topic during
the last century, concluding with some reflections on public policy."
The questions that Halbrook has settled as well as those he has
raised are extremely important. Whether one wants more laws restricting guns, fewer restrictions on gun rights, or legal and historical evidence about what the second amendment really means, the
book will provide new facts and insights. The author does not exaggerate when he says that this is "the most comprehensive constitutional history of the right to keep and bear arms published to date."
Beyond that, however, the book implies a range of questions and
difficult problems about which new books will have to be written.
Within the limits of a constitutional history of the second
amendment the work is conclusive-that is, it demonstrates beyond
reasonable doubt that the second amendment was meant to guarantee an individual right, not an exclusively collective right. It further
demonstrates that, except for the "black codes" in the South, most
American laws and court decisions have upheld the right of individual Americans to keep and bear arms. And Halbrook argues that
the precedents that seem to imply a "collective right only" are misleading, mistaken, or irrelevant.
I

In order to establish the context of the amendment Halbrook
begins by examining the intellectual traditions pertaining to arms.
Unfortunately, these early chapters-"The Elementary Books of
Public Right" and "The Common Law ofEngland"-are the weakest in the book. Halbrook is not a trained historian. His surveys of
I.

2.

Attorney and author of Social Philosophy ( 1972).
Professor Emeritus, Reed College.
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Greco-Roman philosophy, of sixteenth and seventeenth-century
politics and political theory, and of the English common law tradition are superficial. Faults and flaws should not be confused with
deliberate limitation, but Halbrook ought to have explained why he
omitted biblical and other religious references to arms, violence,
and the right of self-defense. Historical collaboration would have
improved and strengthened this pioneering effort to survey the traditions of armed self-defense.
It is instructive to consider some of the flaws and errors in Halbrook's early chapters, because a more accurate, better balanced account would enhance Halbrook's main arguments in later chapters.
Aside from thinking that King John succeeded Henry II, that an
act of Charles II in 1670 was aimed at forcing "idle, disorderly and
mean persons" to continue "in a position of serfdom," and other
historical solecisms, most of Halbrook's errors are negative: failure
to define terms, failure to convey historical complexity, and a naive
trust in scissors-and-paste methods.
Halbrook tends to see the English and European past in black
and white. He describes a Manichean struggle between commoners
and aristocrats, rulers and populace, absolutists and republicansin short, a long war between benighted elitists, defending force, submission, and monarchial absolutism, and The People, whose philosophical allies defended freedom and republican virtue.
If Halbrook had tried to define "absolutism," "divine right,"
"feudalism," "aristocracy," "commoners," "peasants," "serfs" and
other historical terms including "Whig," he might have presented a
truer picture of the fight for freedom. He would not have written
that the death knell of feudalism was struck when "serfs and burghers" began to acquire firearms, or that "statutes of Henry VII,
Henry VIII and James II sought to disarm the aspiring bourgeois
and peasant classes." Arms control legislation did encompass discrimination, but that is scarcely the whole story.
The reason for criticizing Halbrook's version of English history
is that the "tensions" and struggles between common law and statute, between crown and commons, and between gentry and commonalty, were much more complex than Halbrook assumes; and
America's Founding Fathers were not unmindful of historical ironies and complexities. The American Constitution, including the
second and other amendments, owed almost as much to English
and American history and legal practice as it did to theory.
II
The remainder of the book, which discusses American history,
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is much better: clear, concise, and very seldom marred by
oversimplification.
A recurrent question in American history was what the role of
the standing army should be, as opposed to the "national guard"
and the militia (i.e., the armed commonalty). Behind this, of
course, lay the English experience with dangers to liberty (especially
Protestant liberty) of a standing army. It is not surprising that "the
cry for independent militias, composed of citizens who would keep
their own arms, spread through the colonies at the end of 1774 and
during the beginning of 1775." Halbrook quotes, appropriately
enough, Tom Paine's "Thoughts on Defensive War" (1775): "arms
like laws discourage and keep the invader and the plunderer in awe,
and preserve order in the world as well as property."
The phrasing of the second amendment was directly influenced
by the American experience of having to rely at first on the militia
to confront the British regular army. The second amendment
reads: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not
be infringed." Every word and phrase in the amendment was carefully chosen, as Halbrook demonstrates. The meaning of the word
"militia" was, and still is, "the armed citizenry," not "the Armed
Forces" in uniform. The militia, consisting of able-bodied males
from eighteen to forty-five years of age, is today a legally defined
group which may be called up in emergencies, as it was in 1941 in
Hawaii after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Halbrook discusses the Federalist promise to trust the people
with arms, and the Anti-Federalist fears that a "select militia," or
standing army would become a threat to freedom, unless the people's right to arms was guaranteed in a Bill of Rights. Tench Coxe,
a prominent Federalist, urged that "the unlimited power of the
sword is not in the hands of either the federal or state governments,
but, where I trust in God it will ever remain, in the hands of the
people." Federalists and anti-Federalists might quarrel with each
other about the need for a Bill of Rights, but they all agreed that the
people at large had the right to keep and bear arms (their own common, private weapons), not only for self-protection, but for the defense of freedom and a "free state." Halbrook draws a most
important but frequently disregarded conclusion:
In recent years it has been suggested that the Second Amendment protects the
"collective" right of states to maintain militias, while it does not protect the right of
"the people" to keep and bear arms. If anyone entertained this notion in the period
during which the Constitution and Bill of Rights were debated and ~atified, it remains one of the most closely guarded secrets of the eighteenth century, for no
known writing surviving from the period between 1787 and 1791 states such a the-
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sis. The phrase "the people" meant the same thing in the Second Amendment as it
did in the First, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments-that is, each and every
free person.

What was the origin, then, of the view that the second amendment did not apply to the states? The answer, Halbrook makes
clear, lay in "the context of slavery." Antebellum commentators
were unanimous in declaring that the right to keep and bear arms
was recognized by common law, and was specified in the Bill of
Rights, but the crucially important question, was whether or not
slaves were "people" in the context of constitutional rights.
Halbrook observes that the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld a slave code provision denying even "free people of color" the
right to carry firearms, on the ground that they "cannot be considered as citizens." The Dred Scott decision frankly recognized that if
blacks were to be considered citizens then they would have all the
rights of citizens, including the right to keep and bear arms. Deprivation of arms was the invisible bracelet of the slave.
After the Civil War the states of the old Confederacy tried to
use pretexts of various kinds to keep blacks from acquiring and using arms. The various "black codes" were in effect attempts to retain slavery without the name. Congress reacted by passing
legislation that culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
fourteenth amendment.
Halbrook contributes greatly to our understanding of the Constitution by demonstrating exactly how and why the courts construed the fourteenth amendment as incorporating the second. By
establishing the meaning and chronology of second amendment incorporation Halbrook disposes of two well-publicized gun prohibitionist arguments: that the second amendment applies only to the
federal government (states should therefore be free to prohibit private gun ownership); and that the second amendment guarantees
only the right of states to arm their own militias (National Guards).
Halbrook's summary is uncompromising: "A comprehensive survey of the committee reports of all states reveals not the slightest
suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment failed to protect the individual right to keep and bear arms from state infringement" (p.
122).

Perhaps the most striking declaration of incorporation was delivered by Justice Brown. Brown wrote that:
The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten amendments to the Constitution,
commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel
principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities
which had from time immemorial been subject to certain well recognized exceptions
arising from the necessities of the case. In incorporating these principles into the
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fundamental law there was no intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been formally expressed. Thus, the freedom
of speech and of the press (art. I) does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to public morals or private
reputation; the right of the people to keep and bear arms (art. 2) is not infringed by
laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons .... 3

Halbrook has framed his arguments in these central chapters
with exceptional care for legal meanings and implications, and also
with an eye for the apt, and often eloquent, quotation. His own
style is clear and plain, which suits his purpose-to inform and argue, not to persuade by turns of phrase. He makes no concessions
to the bumper-sticker mentality. Reading his book requires concentration but is well worth the effort, It would be unfair to try to
summarize his arguments and epitomize his evidence. I shall therefore only touch upon a few of the central arguments before proceeding to discuss the policy implications of the book.
Just as geographical benchmarks may be misinterpreted, either
carelessly or deliberately, so may court decisions. Halbrook demonstrates in some detail why the leading Supreme Court cases offer no
support to the gun prohibitionists.
In United States v. Miller 4 the Court restricted the arms that
an individual might lawfully possess to personal military or militia
arms and sidearms. At the same time, however, the Court recognized that the militia was composed of "the entire armed population-not simply the organized armed minorities on the payroll of
the U.S. or state governments." Recent decisions have not defined
the extent to which the fourteenth amendment incorporates the second, but after examining what he calls the "methodology," and the
sources used by the Supreme Court in various cases, Halbrook concludes that
in the minds of its framers and the people who adopted it, the Fourteenth Amendment protected the fundamental individual right to own and possess firearms from
state deprivation. If the Supreme Court adheres to its historical methodology ... it
will someday be compelled to recognize the full worth of this constitutional right.
(P. 176).

In his review of state and federal judicial opinions Halbrook
confronts some of the most controversial, and recklessly argued issues in recent legislative and court history. Pretexts, bad history,
misrepresentations, logical fallacies, political rhetoric, lies, and
myths have sprouted like weeds in the fields of argument. The great
merit of this book is that it sets the historical record straight. That,
3.
4.

Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897).
307 u.s. 174 (1939).
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of course, does not settle all policy questions, but it does settle some
important ones. Halbrook is perhaps right to urge that "[o]verly
restrictive interpretations of the second amendment are associated
with reactionary concepts in several respects, including elitism,
militarism, and racism" (p. 195). But the irony is that it is liberals
who have been leading the fight to destroy the second amendment
by misinterpreting it.
Ill

The real question is not the constitutional status of the right to
bear arms, but the extent of regulation that may be allowed without
impairing the purposes of the amendment. On this there is controversy. Kates has argued that since, in the eighteenth century, military arms, militia arms, and private arms were much the same
(cannon excepted) and in the twentieth century they are not, the
second amendment cannot be interpreted to mean that a citizen has
the right to arm himself with heavy ordnance-mortars, tanks,
howitzers, etc.--or with "gangster" weapons (e.g., sub-machine
guns).5 Legitimate weapons for self-defense (or for the defense of
freedom by militiamen) must be "lineally descended" from the
kinds of militia arms known to the Founders. Restrictions on the
size, purpose, calibre, and nature of weapons do not violate the second amendment, according to Kates. Furthermore, "neither registration nor permissive licensing are per se violative of the
amendment since they operate only to exclude gun ownership by
those upon whom the amendment confers no rights"-namely,
felons, juveniles, and madmen.
Halbrook took issue with Kates.6 In a subsequent debate
Kates accepted Halbrook's evidence that "to keep and bear arms,"
means that individual citizens may bear arms in public (carrying
weapons is not just for members of the organized militia). But
Kates maintained that other legal restrictions--on "carrying concealed," for example-are still fully constitutional. What strikes
this reader is the extent to which Kates and Halbrook agree about
ends, and their willingness to be persuaded by evidence as to means.
Recent scholarship has helped to dispel two myths-the one,
propounded by gun control advocates, is that only ignorant, rowdy
red-necks oppose gun controls; the other, favored by a few writers
in the popular gun press, is that the worst "gun grabbers" are media
5. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,
82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983).
6. Halbrook To Bear Arms for Self-Defense: Our Second Amendment Heritage, AM.
RIFLEMAN, Nov. 1985, at 28.
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elitists and cracked eggheads in universities. What is obvious is that
many people, including scholars, are polarized over the issues of
gun control, crime control, and the strategies for achieving each.
The greater the disagreements, the more strident the arguments, the more likely it is that evidence, reason, and compromise
will give way to slogans, hatreds, and ultimatums. What the Constitution means is not only what the founders thought and wrote
(history records the fact that slavery was once constitutional), but
also what we today, after our best efforts to understand the aspirations embodied in the document, make of it. The Constitution and
its history constitute common ground, disputed but still shared by
those who would limit and by those who would extend the right to
keep and bear arms.
That Every Man Be Armed challenges the constitutional interpretation of gun prohibitionists. Halbrook's evidence cannot be ignored, nor can his arguments be dismissed. Those who choose to go
on believing prohibitionist pronouncements about the meaning of
the second amendment will have to do so in spite of the facts.

CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ART OF POLITICS.
By Lief H. Carter.t New York: Pergamon Press. 1985. Pp.
xviii, 216. Cloth, $29.50; paper, $12.95.
Gregory Leyh 2
If a play is any good, any act of it, any scene of it, any character of it, can be
interpreted fifteen different ways, each one as good as the other .... The script itself
is merely the raw material on which a group of collaborators have got to work. It is
not the finished article. That idea is merely the invention, for the most basely materialistic reasons, of literary professors.
Tyrone Guthrie

This is a time of political and intellectual ferment in constitutional theory. Several impressive books arguing for one or another
preferred theory of constitutional jurisprudence have recently
caught our attention. Increasingly, also, constitutional scholars are
turning to philosophy for clarification of the central issues in constitutional interpretation. The general effort to forge a conscious
I. Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia.
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science, lllinois Wesleyan University. I would like
to thank Karen Gervais for her comments on an earlier draft.

